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The Loco Parent: Federal Policy and Family Life* 
Theodore Caplow ** 
The intervention of the federal government in the family has 
not been very successful. What I want to consider with you are 
the reasons why the federal programs designed to improve various 
aspects of family life so often aggravate the problems they are 
designed to resolve. 
A sociologist of some note once wrote that: 
There emerged a new conception of political action as a self- 
contained, self-justifying process capable of creating a t  will a 
workable new arrangement for society. The government's arbi- 
trary meddling with traditional social relations gave the strong- 
est sanction to the feeling, already widely diffused in the civil 
society, that those relations had no intrinsic validity.' 
The sociologist was Alexis de Tocqueville, and the government to 
which he referred was the old regime in France before the revolu- 
tion of 1789. There are some perceptible differences between the 
government of Louis XVI and our government today, but there 
also are similarities. We were taught in school that the old regime 
was doomed by its resistance to change. But de Tocqueville, who 
looked into the matter more carefully, found that it was brought 
down because it tampered ignorantly with social institutions and 
left a barren space on the ground where those institutions had 
stood. 
I do not propose that all of our traditional family arrange- 
ments deserve to be retained. Many of the government's goals are 
laudable. Yet, on the whole, the government's expenditure of 
many billions of dollars for the improvement of family life has 
done more damage than good-mysteriously frustrated by some- 
thing in the social machinery. 
The Aid to Families with Dependent Children program 
(AFDC)2 continues to function as a family-smashing device. 
Studies of the welfare population have shown again and again 
* Remarks at  the Fifth Annual Conference on Government Impact in Family Life a t  
Brigham Young University, February 19, 1976. 
** Commonwealth Professor of Sociology, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Vir- 
ginia. A.B., 1939, The University of Chicago; Ph.D., 1946, University of Minnesota. 
1. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, THE OLD REGIME AND THE REVOLUTION (1865). 
2. The Aid to Families with Dependent Children program is provided for by 42 U.S.C. 
4 4  601 et seq. (1970). 
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how, in the typical case, the family breaks up soon after entitle- 
ment for federal welfare payments is first e~tablished.~ Indeed, 
the system virtually guarantees a greater aggregate income to 
persons who dissolve their family ties.' Despite a great deal of 
tinkering and tampering, AFDC continues to manufacture an 
unending stream of fatherless families, whose children are perma- 
nently incapacitated in the race for a decent standard of living. 
The singularity of this effect is reinforced when we consider that 
all other industrial countries have had underclasses living in pov- 
erty, but that nearly all of them have been able to design govern- 
ment programs that alleviate poverty without destroying the fam- 
ilies of the poor.Vlainly, some of what we are doing must be 
misguided. 
Another area of government activity that impinges on the 
family is the Medicare-Medicaid program. We are now managing 
to spend upwards of $25 billion a year to obtain a lower level of 
3. See, e.g., T .  CAPLOW, TOWARD SOCIAL HOPE (1975); J .  KERSHAW, GOVERNMENT 
AGAINST POVERTY (1970); THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON INCOME MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS, 
BACKGROUND PAPERS (1970). 
4. The basic Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC), adopted in 
27 states, requires that one of the parents be absent from the home for the family to 
qualify. The Unemployed Parent program (AFDC-UP), optional with the states, provides 
assistance when fathers are in the home but unemployed. 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1970). In the 
23 states that have adopted the AFDC-UP program, families with two able-bodied parents 
in the home may receive AFDC, but only if the father does not work more than 100 hours 
per month and does not receive unemployment insurance benefits. See Hearings on the 
Economic Problems of Women before the Joint Economic Comm., 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 
pt. 2, a t  339-40 (1973) (remarks of Congresswoman Griffiths). The effect of each system 
is illustrated by Senator Long's example: 
Here there is a family where the father sees his children regularly, perhaps 
everyday. He is not married to the mother, but let us say, he is making $5,000 
a year which would average out to a little over $400 a month but, enough to 
support that family. Now, if he were doing what the ordinary father does; that 
is, living with the family and sharing his income with them, then fine. But let 
us just assume, for the sake of argument, that [he is not living with the family 
and] the family is on the welfare rolls a t  $2,400 a year or $200 a month . . . . 
So that there is this family with a combined income of $7,400; then here is 
another family living right next door, and the father is working and doing the 
same thing, has the same income of $5,000 . . . and he is taxed, so that his taxes 
help to pay money out to the family who has the $7,400 income. 
Hearings on S. 1842 & S. 2081 Before the Senate Comm. of Finance, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 
122 (1973) (remarks of Senator Long). In order to supplement his income, therefore, the 
truly responsible low-income father will leave his family to qualify them for AFDC pay- 
ments. 
5. See P. CHOMBART DE LAUWE, DES HOMMES ET DES VILLES (1965). For brief reviews 
of foreign welfare programs see THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON INCOME MAINTENANCE PRO- 
GRAMS, BACKGROUND PAPERS 31-37 (1970); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, 
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, 
1975 (1975). 
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family health care, on the average, than when the program was 
~ t a r t e d . ~  As a system for maximizing the income of physicians 
and minimizing the attention given to patients, Medicare- 
Medicaid is a sociological marvel. 
Some of you are familiar with the government's efforts to 
protect the morals of the young by, on the one hand, making an 
unlimited supply of pornography available to them and, on the 
other hand, preventing marijuana from falling into their hands. 
The net result of t h e s ~  opposing futilities has been to sharpen the 
generation gap that is a perennial feature of family life in modem 
societies. This problem takes on a peculiar poignancy in this 
country since so much public money is spent on activities that 
widen the gap. 
There are numerous other examples; the pattern is consis- 
tent. Consider the federal low-rent public housing program, 
which so consistently develops new slums that, in terms of social 
relations, are worse than the old slums they replace. The Bureau 
of Indian Affairs, which, given a free hand with its specialized 
programs, has found i t  possible to wreck family and kinship 
structures beyond repair. The curious effects on marriage and the 
employment of women produced by some government agencies' 
insistence that the recognition of any differences between the 
sexes in temperament, physique, or attitudes is contrary to the 
Constitution. 
These failures cannot be blamed on any single branch of 
government. There was a time when the legislature innovated 
and the judiciary prevented; there were other times when the 
executive branch was principally responsible for social improve- 
ment. But at  present, all three branches are busy re-creating the 
American family in no particular image. Their efforts are com- 
plex to begin with and become more complex as they prove faulty 
and are repeatedly repaired and patched. At the heart of the 
government's inability to improve family arrangements is a fun- 
damental lack of understanding of the nature of the family struc- 
ture. 
The family is both an organizational and a moral structure. 
As an organizational structure, its forms throughout the United 
States are rather constant. There is surprisingly little organiza- 
tional variation in the American family by class, religion, ethnic- 
ity, region, race, or anything else. For example, this uniformity 
6. Meuller & Gibson, National Health Expenditures, Fiscal Year 1975, 39 SOCIAL 
SECURITY BULL. 6 (Feb. 1976). 
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may be seen in bilateral descent arrangements with no tendency 
to favor either the mother's or the father's side; an ingenious 
method of dropping off peripheral relatives in the third degree; a 
tendency to give much more weight to affinal relationships (those 
created by marriage) than most other societies; and a unique set 
of procedures for accommodating step and halfsibling relation- 
ships.' When we ask how well great-grandparents are remem- 
bered, how one ought to behave toward a sister-in-law or mother- 
in-law, or any other "hard" kinship question, we discover that 
nearly the entire population, with its diverse cultural origins and 
personal preferences, is included in a fairly uniform behavioral 
pattern. 
But as a moral structure, the American family is remarkably 
pluralistic. The family depends for its continuance, either ab- 
stractly as an institution or concretely as an individual family, on 
the maintenance of certain sentiments, obligations, and reciproc- 
ities that are neither automatic nor self-generating. The reasons 
why husband and wife cleave together, why children honor their 
parents, and why brothers do not take pay from each other are 
not derived from the state or its secular culture. There are moral 
sentiments underlying the interactions that constitute the fam- 
ily; otherwise, there would be no family. Self-interest alone will 
not account for them, and the legal order cannot enforce them. 
These moral sentiments do not come out of the same com- 
mon pool of expectations as the organizational structure. The 
United States was, from the beginning, a morally pluralistic so- 
ciety. Although its moral expectations might be drawn from the 
same Judeo-Christian tradition, they come in such a variety of 
forms and with such a variety of commitments that no single 
framework could possibly embrace or define them. The framers 
of the Constitution were acutely aware of this as they erected a 
wall between church and state. Both believers and unbelievers 
wanted the state to be permanently incapacitated from meddling 
with the church. They feared that the state might corrupt the 
church by ignoring the morally pluralistic nature of the society 
over which it was placed. But they also feared that the church 
might corrupt the state by imposing values on it that the state 
had no means of legitimating. In the kind of society they envis- 
aged, moral values are ultimately derived from individual or 
collective consciences that are entirely unofficial. 
- - - - - - -- 
7. Kinship structure studies reveal these and other examples of organizational uni- 
formity. See C. KIRKPATRICK, THE FAMILY AS PROCESS AND INSTITUTION (3d ed. 1970). 
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Although the same reasoning applies to the family, the fra- 
mers did not specifically provide for the separation of family and 
state because they assumed the absence of any possible connec- 
tion between the family and the federal union. Had they decided 
to regulate the relationship, they presumably would have stipu- 
lated that the family and the state should be kept separate on 
much the same grounds as in the case of religion. The government 
is likely to corrupt the family whenever i t  attempts to improve it 
because it has no legitimate authority to set moral goals for indi- 
viduals. There is something very odd about a federal agency issu- 
ing circulars on the redefinition of sex roles-as currently hap- 
pens. The government has no place from which to draw the moral 
sentiments that would make i t  possible for it to say anything 
meaningful on the subject. There is no breath to sound that voice. 
To have any realistic hope of success, a program of interven- 
tion in the family must begin with an image of what the family 
ought to be. That image must include the moral sentiments that 
make one family better than another. But how are those senti- 
ments derived? They continue, as in the 18th century, to be 
drawn from religion, from the private conscience, from the moral- 
ity of ethnic groups, and from the tradition of special heritages. 
They are not in the general political domain, and there is no way 
to put them there. 
This problem, if not peculiar to the United States, is more 
acute here than in other industrial nations. In the countries of 
Eastern Europe, where the Communist party is officially defined 
as the source of all values, governments have little difficulty de- 
signing and administering programs of intervention in the family. 
The governments want the family to raise citizens more devoted 
to the state than to friends. They want the family to suppress 
restlessness and dissent so that  people do not insist on the right 
to move freely about the country or attach undue importance to 
freedom of expression. It is fairly easy for the Soviet programmer 
to define the ideal family. Curiously enough, his definition turns 
out to resemble a provincial bourgeois family of the 19th century, 
which, by trial and error, governments have determined to be 
best suited to the goals they wish to implement. The ability to 
legislate for the family is not limited to socialist regimes. France, 
although perhaps not a highly religious society, has a single, 
rather unified, religious tradition. The French state officially rec- 
ognizes a connection between attachment to the state and attach- 
ment to the home, so i t  is quite feasible for the French govern- 
ment to have, as it does, a reasonable program for improving 
family life. 
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In summary, in order to intervene successfully in the family, 
a government must be supported by a broad popular consensus 
about what the family should be and do. There is no way to 
achieve that kind of consensus in this country without a funda- 
mental-and I think undesirable-transformation of our morally 
pluralistic society, although it may be possible within the con- 
fines of local jurisdictions. The federal government, even though 
it can unwittingly damage the family institution, is fundamen- 
tally incapable of improving it, since any real improvement of the 
family must consist, in the long run, of some strengthening of the 
moral sentiments by means of religion, ideology, or personal expe- 
rience. 
